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Abstract
In this paper we provide a semantical meta-theory that will support the development
of higher-order calculi for automated theorem proving like the corresponding methodology
has in rst-order logic. To reach this goal, we establish classes of models that adequately
characterize the existing theorem-proving calculi and we present a standard methodology of
abstract consistency methods (by providing the necessary model existence theorems) needed
to analyze completeness of machine-oriented calculi with respect to this model classes.
We further parameterize the introduced semantical structures and the corresponding ab-
stract consistency properties with an order k. This provides a ner proof methodology which
can be used to show that the primitive substitution rule in resolution calculi as discussed in
[And71] or [BK97] can be restricted with respect to the order of the input problems without
losing completeness.
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2 2 INFORMAL EXPOSITION
1 Motivation
In classical rst-order predicate logic, it is rather simple to assess the deductive power of a calcu-
lus: rst-order logic has a well-established and intuitive set-theoretic semantics, relative to which,
completeness can easily be veried using for instance the abstract consistency method (see for
instance the introductory textbooks [And86, Fit90]). This well-understood meta-theory has sup-
ported the development of calculi adapted to special applications { such as automated theorem
proving (see for instance [Bib98] for an overview).
In higher-order logics, the situation is rather dierent: the intuitive set-theoretic standard
semantics cannot give a sensible notion of completeness, since it does not admit complete cal-
culi [God31]. However, there is a more general notion of semantics (the so-called Henkin-
models [Hen50]), that allows complete calculi and therefore sets the standard for deductive power
of calculi.
Peter Andrews' \Unifying Principle for Type Theory" [And71] provides a method of higher-
order abstract consistency that has become the standard tool for completeness proofs in higher-
order logic, even though it can only be used to show completeness relative to a certain Hilbert
style calculus T. A calculus C is called complete relative to a calculus C
0
, i C proves all theorems
of C
0
. Since T is not complete with respect to Henkin models, the notion of completeness that can
be established by this method is a strictly weaker notion than Henkin completeness.
As a consequence, the calculi developed for higher-order automated theorem proving [Hue73,
And71, Mil83, Koh95] and the corresponding theorem proving systems such as Tps [ABI
+
96],
or earlier versions of the authors' Leo
1
are not or cannot be proven complete with respect to
Henkin models. Moreover, they are not even sound with respect to T, since all of them utilize
-conversion, which is not a theorem of T. In other words, their deductive power lies somewhere
between T and Henkin models.
In this situation, the aim of this paper is to provide a semantical meta-theory that will support
the development of higher-order calculi for automated theorem proving like the corresponding
methodology has in rst-order logic. To reach this goal, we establish
 classes of models that adequately characterize the deductive power of existing theorem-
proving calculi (making them sound and complete), and
 a standard methodology of abstract consistency methods (by providing the necessary model
existence theorems, which extend Andrews' Unifying Principle), so that the completeness
analysis for higher-order calculi will become a simple exercise like in rst-order logic.
Due to the inherent complexity of higher-order semantics we will use the next section for an
informal exposition of the issues covered and the techniques applied.
2 Informal Exposition
Before we turn to the exposition of the semantics in section 2.2 and discuss some applications of
the results (section 2.3), let us specify what we mean by \higher-order logic": any simply typed
logical system that allows quantication over function and predicate variables. Technically, we
will employ a logical system HOL, which is based on the simply typed -calculus. A related logical
system is discussed in detail in [And86].
2.1 Higher-Order Logic (HOL)
HOL-formulae are built up from the set V of variables, and the signature  (a set of typed
constants) as applications and -abstractions. The set w

() of well-formed formulae
term consists of those that can be given a type  so that in all applications, the types of the
1
Based on the results of this paper the resolution calculus underlying newer versions of Leo [Ben97, BK98] can
be proven complete for Henkin models based, see [BK97].
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arguments are the argument types of the function. We will denote variables with upper-case letters
(X

; Y; Z;X
1

; X
2

: : :), constants with lower-case letters (c

; f
!
; : : :) and well-formed formulae
with upper-case bold letters (A

;B;C
1
; : : :)
2
. Finally, we abbreviate multiple applications and
abstractions in a kind of vector notation, so that AU
k
denotes k-fold application (associating to
the left) and X
k
A denotes k-fold -abstraction (associating to the right) and use the square dot
as an abbreviation for a pair of brackets, where stands for the left one with its partner as far to
the right, as is consistent with the bracketing already present in the formula.
We will use the terms like free and bound variables or closed formulae in their standard
meaning and use Free(A) for the set of free variables of a formula A. In particular alphabetic
change of names of bound variables as built into our HOL: we consider alphabetic variants to be
identical (viewing the actual representation as a representative of an alphabetic equivalence class)
and use a notion of substitution that avoids variable capture, systematically renaming bound
variables. We could also have used de Bruijn's indices [dB72], as a concrete implementation of
this approach at the syntax level.
We denote a substitution that instantiates a free variable X with a formula A with [A=X ] and
write ; [A=X ] for the substitution that is identical with  but instantiates X with A.
If A has a subterm B at position p, we denote this by A[B]
p
and we will write the operation
of replacing this subterm by a formula C with [C=p]A.
The structural equality relation of HOL is induced by -reduction
(XA)B  !

[B=X ]A (X CX)  !

C
whereX is not free inC. It is well-known, that the reduction relations , , and  are terminating
and conuent on w

(), so that there are unique  normal forms (see for instance [Bar84] for
an introduction).
In HOL, the set of base types is fo; g for truth values and individuals. We will call a formula of
type o a proposition and a sentence, if it is closed. We will assume that the signature contains
logical constants for negation :
o!o
, conjunction ^
o!o!o
, quantication
3


(!o)!o
, and
possibly equality =

!!o
, all other constants are called parameters, since the argumentation
in this paper is parametric their choice; we only assume that there are closed formulae for both
base types, and as a consequence that all types are non-empty. In particular, we do not assume
the existence of description or choice operators. For a detailed discussion of the semantic issues
raised by the presence of these logical constants see [And72b].
It is matter of folklore that equality can directly be expressed in HOL e.g. by the Leibniz
formula for equality in terms of the other connectives
Q

:= (X

Y

8P
!o
PX ) PY )
With this denition, the formula (A
:
=

B), which we use as an abbreviation for Q

AB -reduces
to 8P
!o
(PA) ) (PB), which can be read as: formulae A and B are not equal, i there exists
a discerning property P
4
. In other words, A and B are equal, if they are indiscernible. There are
alternatives to dene equality in terms of the logical connectives (see for example [And86, p. 155]).
In this paper we dierentiate between ve dierent notions of equality. In order to prevent
misunderstandings we explain these dierent notions together with their syntactical representation
here:
If we dene a concept we use := (e.g. let D := fT; Fg) and  represents Meta-equality. We
refer to the equality relation as an object of our semantical domains with q; note that we possibly
have one q

in each domain D

. The remaining two notions,
:
= and =, are related to syntax. =

may occur as a constant symbol of type  in a signature  and nally
:
=

(and sometimes also
Q

) for Leibniz equality.
2
We will denote the type of formulae as an index, if it is not clear from the context.
3
With this quantication constant, standard quantication of the form 8X

A can be regained as an abbreviation
for 

(X

A)
4
Note that by contraposition we easily get the backward direction of ( and hence it is sucient to use )
instead of ,.
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2.2 Notions of Models for HOL
Let us now explore the semantic notions needed to understand gure 1. We will discuss the
model classes from bottom to top, from the most specic notion of standard models (ST)to the
most general notion of -complexes, motivating the respective generalizations as we go along. In
section 3, we will proceed the other way around, specializing the notion of a -model (M) more
and more.
The symbols in the boxes in gure 1 denote model classes, the symbols labeling the arrows
indicate the properties inducing the corresponding specialization, and the r-symbols next to the
boxes indicate the clauses in the denition of abstract consistency class (cf. 4.4) that are needed
to establish a model existence theorem for this class of models.
A standard model (ST, cf. Denition 3.30) for HOL provides a xed set D

of individuals,
and a set D
o
:= fT; Fg of truth values. All the domains for the complex types are dened induc-
tively: D
!
is the set of functions f :D

! D

. The evaluation function I
'
with respect to an
interpretation I:  ! D of constants and an assignment ' of variables is obtained by the stan-
dard homomorphic construction that evaluates a -abstraction with a function, whose operational
semantics is specied by -reduction.
One can reconstruct the key idea behind Henkin models (H, cf. Denition 3.30) by the
following observation. If the set D

is innite, the set D
!o
of sets of individuals must be uncount-
ably innite. On the other hand, any semantics that admits sound and complete calculi must
have countable models, because of the compactness theorem that comes with a complete calculus.
Leon Henkin generalized the class of admissible domains for functional types. Instead of requiring
D
!
to be the full set of functions, it is sucient to require that D
!
has enough members that
any well-formed formula can be evaluated
5
. Note that with this generalized notion of a model,
there are less formulae that are valid in all models (intuitively, for any given formulae there are
more possibilities for counter-models). In the particular case, the generalization to Henkin models,
restricts the set of valid formulae suciently, so that all of them can be proven by a Hilbert-style
calculus [Hen50].
It is matter of folklore that primitive notion equality (expressed by a primitive equality constant
=2 ) is not strictly needed, since it can be expressed by the Leibniz formula. However, the Leibniz
formula only really denotes the semantic equality relation, if D
!o
contains enough properties to
discern members of ; in fact, we need that for all a 2 D

, the singleton set fag is in D
!o
(see the proof of Lemma 3.35).
6
In other words, we are in the somewhat paradoxical situation,
that Leibniz Equality (which is commonly used as a substitute for primitive equality) will only
denote semantical equality, if we can guarantee that the identity relation is already present in the
model (we call this property q, cf. Denition 3.27). Hence we introduce corresponding semantical
structures, namely Henkin models without property Q (M
fb
), in which property q is not necessarily
valid and thus Leibniz equality does not necessarily denote the equality relation. An example for
a theorem which is valid within the class of Henkin models but not in the class of M
fb
's, is given
by the axiom of functional extensionality for Leibniz equality (8F
!
8G
!
(8X

FX
:
= GX))
F
:
=

G), see lemma 3.36.
The next generalization of model classes comes from the fact that we want to characterize the
deductive power of higher-order theorem provers mentioned above on a semantic level (we will take
Tps [ABI
+
96] as an example). Note that Tps cannot be complete with respect to Henkin models
and is even not generally complete for M
fb
's, although there is some `extensionality treatment'
build into the proof procedure. The uncompleteness of Tps for Henkin models
7
is due to the fact,
that it, fails to refute formulae such as cA
o
^ :c(::A), where c is a constant of type o ! o or
cA
!o
^ cB
!o
) c(X

AX ^BX), where c is a constant of type ( ! o) ! o. The problem
5
In other words: the functional universes are rich enough to satisfy the comprehension axioms.
6
On a similar note, Peter Andrews remarked in [And72a] that if the set D
!!o
is so sparse, that semantic
identity relation is not present, then it is possible to construct a Henkin model, where Leibniz equality is non-
extensional.
7
In case the extensionality axioms are not available in the search space. Note that one can add extensionality
axioms to the calculus in order to achieve, at least in theory, Henkin completeness. But this heavily increases the
search space and thus is not feasible in practice.
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Figure 1: The landscape of Higher-Order Semantics
in the former example is that the higher-order unication algorithm employed by Tps cannot
determine that A and ::A denote identical semantic objects (by the extensionality principle on
truth values), and thus returns failure instead of success. In the second example in addition to
this the principle of functional extensionality is needed in order to prove the theorem.
The lack of completeness of refutation procedures like Tps occurs especially in these situations,
where HOL-formulae contain occurrences of propositional formulae dominated by uninterpreted
constants or variables or where this problem is mixed with the problem of functional extensionality;
in our examples the function constant c dominates the proposition A
o
or the sets A
!o
and
B
!o
. To give a semantical characterization of the deductive power of the Tps procedure, we
have to generalize the class of Henkin models further, so that there are counter-models to the
examples above. Obviously, this involves weakening the assumption that D
o
 fT; Fg (we call this
assumption for Henkin models property b), since this entails that the values of A and ::A are
identical: In functional -models (M
f
;M
fb
;M
q
, cf. Denitions 3.28 and 3.24) we only insist
that there is a valuation  of D
o
, i.e. a function :D
o
! fT; Fg that is coordinated with the
functions I(:), I(^), I(

) and (possibly) I(=

). Thus we have a notion of validity for : we
call a proposition A valid inM := (D; I; ) under an assignment ', i (I
'
(A))  T. In our rst
example, there is a -model structure M  (D; I; ), where I
'
(A) 6 I
'
(::A) and therefore
I
'
(cA) 6 I
'
(c(::A)), if we take I(c) to be the identity function on D

. In particular, we
can have (I
'
(cA)) 6 (I
'
(c(::A))), and therefore (I
'
(cA
o
^ :c(::A)))  T, since  is a
valuation.
Clearly, for functional -models we have the same choices about the role of equality, therefore,
we distinguish the classes M
f
and M
q
of functional -models without/with property q. Further-
more, we have the classM
fb
of functional -models with (only) property b, i.e. where D
o
 fT; Fg.
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Since functional -models with properties b and q are dened to be -Henkin models, we can also
view M
fb
as \Henkin models without property q".
Finally, we even drop the requirement of functional extensionality for -models (cf. De-
nition 3.24). This is the most general semantical notion that we will discuss in this paper; we
only insist that the evaluation function is a homomorphism which respects instantiation. In such
models, a function is not uniquely determined by it's behavior on all possible arguments, therefore
for the construction of such models we need labelings for functions (e.g. a green and a red version
of a function f) that allow to discern them, even though they are functionally equivalent. As done
for functional -models, we analyze properties q and b for non-functional -Models. Whereas b
indeed may or may not hold for non-functional -Models, it turns out that property q implies
functionality and hence there are no non-functional-Models with property q.
Peter Andrews has pioneered the construction of non-functional models with his -complexes
in [And71]. These are even more general constructions than our -models, since totality of
the evaluation function is not assumed. His construction is based on Schutte's semi-valuation
method [Sch60], which only needs partial valuations to construct a model for a given Hintikka set.
In this paper, we concentrate on the other aspects of higher-order models and ensure totality of
our evaluation functions by a saturation condition (cf. 4.9) in our abstract consistency classes. This
does not restrict the applicability of our model existence theorems, since saturation is relatively
simple to prove for a given calculus (see [Koh98, BK97]). For all of the notions of models (except
naturally for standard models, where such a theorem cannot hold), we present model existence
theorems tying the dierentiating conditions of the models to suitable conditions in the abstract
consistency classes (see section 4.4). We can use the classical construction in all cases: abstract
consistent sets are extended to Hintikka sets (see section 4.2), which induce a valuation on a
term structure (see Denition 3.14). In some cases, we have to pass to a quotient structure (see
Denition 3.12) to ensure that the set of truth values is exactly fT; Fg for property b.
The simplest way to ensure property q is by assuming that the signature contains a primitive
logical constant for equality, which is evaluated as semantical identity (we call this property e).
We will study the case in section 4.3. On the one hand, the semantical situation becomes simpler
(see gure 2), since M, M
f
and M
q
are identied, just as M
b
, M
fb
and H. On the other hand, the
existence of another logical constant induces further conditions in the denition of the abstract
consistency classes.
Finally in section 4.5 we rene our methods further by parameterizing them with a type order
k and by requiring the function universes with an order greater than k to be full, i.e. to contain
all functions. With this modied semantical notions it is possible to restrict the conditions in the
abstract consistency classes with respect to the order k. Concretely, the possible instantions of
universally quantied formulas can be restricted to terms with an order less or equal to k. With
this result it becomes possible to show that the primitive substitution rule in the refutation calculi
as discussed in [And71] or [BK97, Koh98] can be restricted with respect to the order of the input
problems without loosing completeness.
2.3 Applications
Applications of the results presented in this paper, not only comprise automated theorem proving,
where calculus development up to now has been guided by Andrew's \Unifying Principle for
Type Theory" [And71]. This model existence theorem has set the completeness standard for
higher-order calculi such as [Hue73, ALCMP84], even though it is weaker than the intuitive one
given by Henkin Models. The semantical notions in section 3 come from the attempt to achieve
completeness with respect to Henkin models for higher-order tableaux [Koh95, Koh98] and higher-
order resolution [Koh94a, Ben97, BK97].
A model existence theorem for a logical system L is a theorem of the form: If a set of sentences
 in L is a member of an abstract consistency class  , then there exists a L-model for . Thus
if we want to show the completeness of a particular calculus C, we rst prove that the class  
of sets of sentences  that are C-consistent (cannot be refuted in C) is an abstract consistency
class, then the model existence theorem tells us that C-consistent sets of sentences are satisable
7in L. Now we assume that a sentence A is valid in L, so :A does not have a L-model and
is therefore C-inconsistent. From this it is easy to verify that A is a theorem of C. Note that
with this argumentation the completeness proof for C condenses to verifying that   is an abstract
consistency class, a task that does not refer to L-models. Thus the usefulness of model existence
theorems derives from the fact that it replaces the model-theoretic analysis in completeness proofs
with the verication of some proof-theoretic conditions (membership in  ). In this respect a model
existence theorem is similar to a Herbrand Theorem, but it is easier to generalize to other logic
systems like higher-order logic. The technique was developed for rst-order logic by J. Hintikka
and R. Smullyan [Hin55, Smu63, Smu68].
Another application of model existence theorems is that they allow for very simple (but non-
constructive) proofs of cut-elimination theorems. In [And71] Peter Andrews applies his \Unifying
Principle" to cut-elimination in a non-extensional sequent calculus, by proving the calculus com-
plete (relative to T) both with and without the cut rule and concludes that cut-elimination is
valid for this calculus. In the extensional case, where a cut-elimination theorem can be found
in [Tak68, Tak87], we can directly model a cut-elimination proof after Andrews' approach, using
the model existence theorem for Henkin models.
A related application lies in proof transformation for higher-order logics [Mil83, Pfe87]. Here,
proofs found by higher-order automated theorem provers can be transformed into other calculi,
such as natural deduction- or sequent calculi that form the basis of tactic-based theorem provers
for classical logics like Isabelle [Pau94] or 
mega [BCF
+
97]. Dale Miller's original proof trans-
formation system for Tps' [Mil83], uses Andrews' \Unifying principle" and only works for non-
extensional calculi like higher-order matings. Frank Pfenning's later extensions (by equality and
extensionality) build on various cut-elimination theorems. Again, the methods developed in this
paper can shed some light on the situation.
In all these applications, the leverage added by this paper is that we can now extend non-
extensional results to extensional cases. However, the generalized model classes have a merit of
their own, for instance in higher-order logic programming [NM94], where the denotational seman-
tics of programs can induce non-standard meanings for the classical connectives. For instance,
given a SLD-like search strategy as in -PROLOG [Mil91], conjunction is not commutative any
more. Therefore, various authors have proposed model-theoretic semantics, where property b fails.
For instance David Wolfram uses Andrew's -complexes [Wol94] as a semantics for -PROLOG
and Gopalan Nadathur uses \labelled structures" for the same purpose in [NM94]. It is plausible
to assume that the results of this paper will be useful for further development in this direction.
3 Semantics for Higher Order Logic
In this section we will introduce the semantical constructions and discuss their relationships. We
will start out with by dening -structures (and as an intermediate step pre--structures) as
algebraic semantics for the simply typed -calculus and then specializing them to various notions
of models by requiring a special treatment of propositional formulae.
3.1 Pre--Structures
Denition 3.1 (Pre--Structure). A collection D := D
T
:= fD



 2 T g of sets D

, indexed
by the set T of types, is called a typed collection (of sets). Let D
T
and E
T
be typed collections,
then a collection I := fI

:D

! E



 2 T g of mappings is called a typed mapping I:D
T
 !
E
T
. indexpre--structure We call the triple A := (D;@; I) a pre--structure, i D = D
T
, is
a typed collection of sets and
@ := f@

:D
!
D

 ! D



;  2 T g
and I:   ! D are typed total functions.
The collection D is called the frame of A, the set D

the universe of type , the function
@ the application operator, and the function I the interpretation of constants.
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We call a pre--structure A := (D;@; I) functional, i the following statement holds for all
f; g 2 D
!
: f  g, if for all a 2 D

f@a  g@a. Note that functionality only poses a restriction
on the function universes.
Remark 3.2. The application operator @ in a pre--structure is an abstract version of function
application. It is no restriction to exclusively use a binary application operator, which corresponds
to unary function application, since we can dene higher-arity application operators from the
binary one by setting (\Currying")
f@(a
1
; : : : ; a
n
) := (: : : (f@a
1
) : : :@a
n
)
Example 3.3. If we dene A@B := (AB) for A 2 w

() and B 2 w

(), then @:w
!
()
w

()  ! w

() is a total function. Thus (w();@; Id

) is a pre--structure. The in-
tuition behind this example is that we can think of the formula A 2 w
!
() as a function
A:w

()  ! w

() ; B 7! (AB).
Analogously, we can dene the pre--structure (cw();@; Id

) of closed formulae.
Example 3.4. The following are (trivial) examples for functional pre--structures:
1. (;  T ; ;; ;) is the empty pre--structure and
2. (fag  T ;@
a
; I
a
), where a@
a
a  a and I
a
(c)  a for all constants c 2  is called the
singleton pre--structure.
Denition 3.5 (-Homomorphism). Let A := (D;@
A
; I) and B := (E ;@
B
;J ) be pre--
structures. A -homomorphism is a typed function :D  ! E such that
1.   I  J .
2. For all f 2 D
!
and g 2 D

we have: (f)@
B
(g)  (f@
A
g).
The most important method for constructing -structures with given properties in this paper
is well-known for algebraic structures and consists in building a suitable -Congruence and passing
to the quotient structure. We will now develop the formal basis for it.
Denition 3.6 (-Congruence). Let A := (D;@; I) be a pre--structure, then a typed equiv-
alence relation  is called a -congruence on A, i f  f
0
2 D
!
and g  g
0
2 D

imply
f@g  f
0
@g
0
.
It is called functional, i for all types ;  and all f; g 2 D
!
the fact that f@a  g@a for
all a 2 D

implies f  g. Note that, since  is a congruence, we also have the other direction so
we have
f@a  g@a for all a 2 D

; i f  g
Lemma 3.7. The  and  equality relations

$

and

$

are congruences on the pre--
structures w() and cw() by denition. Moreover, -equality is functional w() and
cw().
Proof: The congruence properties are a direct consequence of the fact that  reduction rules
are dened to act on sub-term positions. We will establish functionality of

$

on w() rst
and then use this to obtain the assertion for closed formulae.
Let A
!
C


$

B
!
C for all C, then in particular, for any variable X 2 V

that is
not free in A or B, we have AX

$

BX and XAX

$

XBX . By denition we have
A

$

X

AX

$

X

BX

$

B.
To show functionality of  on closed formulae, let A;B 2 cw
!
(), such that A 6

$

B.
Since  is functional on w(), there must be a formula C with AC 6

$

BC. Now let C
0
be a ground instance of C, i.e. C
0
= (C), where  is a closed substitution
8
, then we have
AC
0
6

$

BC
0
. Thus we have shown that A 6

$

B entails AC
0
6

$

BC
0
, which gives us the
assertion.
8
This has to exist, since we have assumed all types to be non-empty.
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Denition 3.8 (Quotient Pre--Structure). Let A := (D;@; I) be a pre--structure, D


:=
f[[f]]


f 2 D

g, and I

(c

) := [[I(c

)]] for all constants c

2 

. Furthermore let @

be dened
by [[f]]@

[[a]] := [[f@a]]. To see that this denition only depends only on equivalence classes of ,
consider f
0
2 [[f]] and g
0
2 [[g]], then [[f@g]]  [[f
0
@g]]  [[f
0
@g
0
]]  [[f@g
0
]]. So @

is well-dened and
total, thus A=

:= (D

;@

; I

) is also a pre--structure. We call A=

the quotient structure of
A for the relation  and the typed function 

:A  ! A=

; f 7! [[f]] its canonical projection.
This denition is justied by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9. Let A be a pre--structure and let  be an -congruence on A, then the canonical
projection 

is a surjective -homomorphism. Furthermore, A=

is functional, i  is functional.
Proof: Let A := (D;@; I) be a pre--structure. To convince ourselves that 

is indeed
a surjective -homomorphism, we note that by denition 

is surjective and I

 

 I.
Now let f 2 D
!
, and g 2 Dom(f)  D

, then g
0
2 [[g]] for all g
0
2 Dom(f) and therefore
[[g]]  

(g) 2 Dom([[f]])  Dom(

(f)) and 

(f)@



(g)  [[f]]@

[[g]]  [[f@g]]  

(f@g).
The quotient construction trivializes  to (meta-)equality, so functionality of  is equivalent
to functionality of A. Formally we have [[f]]  [[g]], i f  g, i f@a  g@a, i [[f@a]]  [[g@a]], i
[[f]]@

[[a]]  [[g]]@

[[a]] for all a 2 D

and thus for all [[a]] 2 D


.
3.2 -Structures
-structures are pre--structures with a notion of evaluation for w().
Denition 3.10 (-Structure). Let A := (D;@; I) be a pre--structure. A typed function
':V  ! D is called an assignment into A. We call a total typed mapping
9
E :F(V ;D) 
w()  ! D an evaluation function for A, i for any assignment ' into A, we have
1. E
'



 I and E
'


V
 '
2. E
'
is a -homomorphism
3. E
'
(A)  E
 
(A), whenever ' and  coincide on Free(A)
4. E
'
([B=X ]A)  E
';[E
'
(B)=X]
(A)
We call A := (D;@; E) -structure, i (D;@; I) is a pre--structure and E is an evaluation
function for A. We call E
'
(A

) 2 D

denotation of A

in A for '.
If A is a closed formula, then E
'
(A) is independent of ', since Free(A) = ;. In these cases
we sometimes drop the reference from E
'
(A) and simply write E(A).
Example 3.11. The pre--structure T  ; cannot be a -structure, since we must have
E
'
(X

X) 2 D
!
. In contrast to this, the singleton pre--structure is a -structure if we
take E(A)  a, where a is the (unique) member of D

.
For a detailed discussion on the closure conditions needed for the function universes to be rich
enough, we refer the reader to [And72a, And73].
Note that the pre--structure w() from 3.3 cannot be made into a -structure by provid-
ing an evaluation function, since there is no formula C  I
'
(X

B) 2 w
!
() such that
C@A  CA  I
';[A=X]
(B). In particular, the \obvious" choice X

B for C does not work,
since (X

B)A 6 I
';[A=X]
(B). In fact, if w() were a -structure, -equality would have to
be valid in w() (cf. 3.17), which it clearly is not.
Denition 3.12 (Quotient -Structure). Let A = (D;@; E) be a -structure,  a -
congruence onA and let A=

= (D

;@

; I

) be the quotient pre--structure ofA, where I = E



.
For any assignment  A=

, there exists an assignment ' into A such that   

', since 

is a surjective -homomorphism. So we can dene E

'
as 

 E
 
, and call A=

:= (D

;@

; E

)
the quotient -structure of A modulo .
Theorem 3.13. Let A be a -structure and  a -congruence on A, then A=

is a -structure.
9
We write F(V;D) for the set of functions f :V ! D
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Proof: We prove that E

is a legal value function by verifying the conditions in 3.10: Let '
and  be assignments, such that   

 ', then
1. E

'



 (

 E
 
)



 

 E
 



 

 I  I

and
E

'


V
 (

 E
 
)


V
 

 E
 


V
 

   '
2. E

'
 

 E
 
is a -homomorphism, since 

and E
 
are.
3. E

'
(A)  [[E
 
(A)]]  [[E
 
0
(A)]]  E

'
0
(A), i ' and '
0
coincide on Free(A), since this entails
that  and  
0
do too.
4. E

'
([B=X ]A)  [[E
 
([B=X ]A)]]  [[E
 ;[E
 
(B)=X]
(A)]]  E

';[E

'
(B)=X]
(A), since [[E
 
(B)]] 
E

'
(B) and therefore 

  ; [E
 
(B)=X ]  '; [E

'
(B)=X ]
Denition 3.14 (Term Structures for ). Let cw()
#

be the collection of well-formed for-
mulae in -normal form and A@

B be the -normal form of AB. For the denition of an
evaluation function let ' be an assignment into cw()
#

. Note that  := '


Free(A)
is a substi-
tution, since Free(A) is nite. Thus we can choose E

'
(A) := (A)
#

, where A
#

is the -normal
form of A. We call TS()

:= (cw()
#

;@

; E

) the -term structure for .
Analogously, we can dene TS()

:= (cw()
#

;@

; E

) the -term structure for .
The name \term structure" in the previous denition is justied by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.15. TS()

is -structure and TS()

is a functional -structure.
Proof: Note that constants are -normal forms, therefore TS()

is the quotient structure
of cw() for the congruence

$

. As we have remarked in 3.11, w() is not a -structure,
so we cannot use 3.13, but have to convince ourselves directly that TS()

is a -structure by
verifying the conditions of 3.10. The rst three are direct consequences of the denition of E

as
substitution application.
1. E

'



 I

= Id

and E

'


V
 '
2. E

'
is a -homomorphism
3. E

'
(A)  (A)  
0
(A)  E
'
0
(A), i ' and '
0
coincide on Free(A)
4. E
'
([B=X ]A)  ([B=X ]A)  [(B)=X ](
0
(A))  ; [(B)=X ]A  E

';[E

'
(B)=X]
(A), where

0
is ; [X=X ].
Since

$

is a sub-relation of

$

, an analogous argumentation shows that TS()

is a -
structure. Furthermore,

$

is a functional -congruence on w() (cf. 3.7), so we know by 3.9
that TS()

is functional.
Remark 3.16. Note that TS()

is not a functional -structure since e.g. (X

Y
!
X)@

C


Y@

C for all C in TS

()

but X Y X 6 Y .
In a general -structure A := (D;@; E) constants are given a meaning by the interpretation
function I:  ! D, and variables get their meaning by assignments ':V ! D. Furthermore, the
evaluation function has to respect instantiation like in rst-order logic. This is enough to ensure
soundness of -equality. We do not have to show soundness of -equality, since this is trivial as
we have assumed alphabetic variants to be identical.
Lemma 3.17 (Soundness of -equality). Let A := (D;@; E) be a -structure and ' an as-
signment into A, then E
'
((XA)B)  E
'
([B=X ]A) provided that X not bound in A.
Proof: By the denition of -structures, we have E
'
((X A)B)  E
'
(XA)@E
'
(B) 
E
';[E
'
(B)=X]
(A)  E
'
([B=X ]A)
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3.3 Functional -structures
For functional -structures, there is another way to dene evaluation: Since well-formed formulae
are inductively built up from constants and variables we can extend ' and I to a -homomorphism
on well-formed formulae.
Denition 3.18 (Homomorphic Extension). Let A := (D;@; I) be a functional pre--
structure and let ' be an assignment into A. Then the homomorphic extension I
'
of '
to w() is inductively dened to be a typed partial function I
'
:w()  ! D such that
1. I
'
(X)  '(X), if X is a variable,
2. I
'
(c)  I(c), if c is a constant,
3. I
'
(AB)  I
'
(A)@I
'
(B),
4. I
'
(X

B

) is the function in D
!
such that I
'
(X

B)@z := I
';[z=X]
(B). Note that
this function is unique, since we have assumed A to be functional.
Note that we have to assume that the universes of functions D
!
are rich enough to contain a
value for all A
!
2 w
!
() for this construction to yield a total function.
Lemma 3.19. Let A := (D;@; I) be a functional pre--structure, then E :' 7! I
'
is an evaluation
function for A.
Proof: To prove the assertion, we have to show the conditions of 3.10. The rst one is trivially
met by construction, the second is a direct consequence of the fact that I
'
 Id

 I  Id

 I on
.
For the third condition, we prove that the value of a function only depends on its free variables
by induction on the structure ofA. The only interesting case is the one, whereA is an abstraction,
since the assertion is trivial for constants and variables, and a simple consequence of the inductive
hypothesis for applications. So let A
:
= (X B), then I
'
(A)@a  I
';[a=X]
(B)  I
 ;[a=X]
(B) 
I
 
(A)@a by inductive hypothesis, since '; [a=X ] and  ; [a=X ] coincide on the free variables of B.
Thus we obtain the assertion from the denition of I
'
.
Finally, we prove the fourth condition by induction on the structure of A. If A is a constant
or variable, then the assertion is trivial. The case where A is the application CD is entailed by
the fact, that substitution and homomorphic extension are dened inductively on the structure of
applications: We have
I
'
([B=X ]CD)  I
'
([B=X ]C)@I
'
([B=X ]D)
 I
';[I
'
(B)=X]
(C)@I
';[I
'
(B)=X]
(D)
 I
';[I
'
(B)=X]
(CD)
If A  (Y D) and   '; [a=Y ], then
I
'
([B=X ]A)@a  I
'
(Y [B=X ]D)@a  I
 
([B=X ]D)  I
 ;[I
 
(B)=X]
(D)
by inductive hypothesis. Note that  and ' coincide on the free variables of A, therefore by the
third condition, which we have proven above, we have I
 ;[I
'
(B)=X]
(D)  I
';[I
'
(B)=X]
(Y D)@a,
which implies the assertion, since A is functional.
In fact, for functional -structures, the two notions of evaluation coincide, as we shall see in
the next lemma.
Lemma 3.20 (Evaluation in functional -Structures). If A := (D;@; E) is a functional -
structure, then E
'
 I
'
for any assignment ' into A.
Proof: Let A 2 w(), we prove the assertion by induction over the size of A. The assertion
is trivial, if A is a constant or variable and a simple consequence of the inductive hypothesis, if
A is an application. So let A := (X B), furthermore let Y be a variable not in Free(A) and
 := '; [a=Y ]. Then
E
'
(A)@a  E
 
(A)@a  E
'
(A)@E
 
(Y )  E
 
(AY )  E
 
([Y=X ]B)
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since -equality is sound in -structures. Now [Y=X ]B is smaller than A, so we can use the
inductive hypothesis to obtain
E
'
(A)@a  I
 
([Y=X ]B)  I
 
(AY )  I
'
(A)@I
 
(Y )  I
'
(A)@a
which entails the assertion since A is functional.
Lemma 3.21. Let A := (D;@; E) be a functional -structure and X be a variable that is not free
in A, then E
'
(X AX)  E
'
(A) for all assignments ' into A.
Proof: With 3.10.3 and the fact that X is not free in A we have
E
'
(XAX)@a  E
';[a=X]
(A)@E
';[a=X]
(X)  E
'
(A)@a
which implies the assertion E
'
(XAX)  E
'
(A), as A is functional.
We now specialize the notion of -structures to the standard general model semantics for 
!
.
Denition 3.22 (-Algebra). A pre--algebra A := (D; I) is a pre--structure (D;@; I) such
that D
!
 F(D

;D

) and f@a  f(a). A pre--algebra is called full, i D
!
 F(D

;D

).
We call a pre--algebra an -algebra, i it is a -structure.
Remark 3.23. Note that pre--algebras are functional, since they are dened as structures of
mathematical functions. On the other hand, for any functional -structure A, we can dene an
isomorphic -algebra A
0
Proof: For a functional -structure A = (D;@; I) we dene a -algebra A
0
= (D
0
; I
0
) and a
bijective -homomorphism :A  ! A
0
by an induction on the type:
 D
0

:= D

for all  2 BT and  = Id
D
; obviously  is bijective.
 D
0
!
:= (D
!
) and (f) =  (@f)
 1
for f 2 D
!
. Note that with this construction
 is a homomorphism, since
(f)((a)) = (f@(
 1
((a)))) = (f@a)
 is surjective by construction and injective, since A is functional: If f 6= g 2 D
!
, then
there is an a 2 D

, such that f(a) 6= g(a), in particular, we have
(f(a)) = (f)@(a) 6= (f)@(a) = (g(a))
since  is injective on D

. Thus and therefore (f) 6= (g), since (f); (g) 2 F(D

;D

)
Now, we only have to choose I
0
:=   I to complete the construction of A
0
.
As a consequence, we can always consider functional -structures as -algebras.
3.4 -Models
Up to now, the semantical notions introduced were totally independent of the set of base types
assumed. Now, we specialize these to obtain a notion of models by requiring specialized behavior
on the type o of truth values. For this we use the notion of a -valuation, which intuitively gives a
truth-value interpretation to the domain D
o
of a -structure, which is consistent with the intuitive
interpretations of the logical constants. Since models are semantic entities that are constructed
to make statements about truth and falsity of formulae, the requirement that there exists a -
valuation is perhaps the most general condition under which one wants to speak of a model. Thus
we will dene our most general notion of semantics as -structures that have -valuations.
Denition 3.24 (-Model). Let A := (D;@; E) be a -structure, then a surjective total func-
tion :D
o
 ! fT; Fg such that
1. (E(:)@a)  T, i (a)  F,
2. (E(_)@a@b)  T, i (a)  T or (b)  T,
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3. (E(

)@f)  T, i (f@a)  T for each a 2 D

is called a -valuation for A and M := (D;@; E ; ) is called a -model (M).
We say that an assignment ' satises a formulaA 2 w
o
() inM (M j=
'
A), i (E
'
(A)) 
T and that A is valid in M, i M j=
'
A for all assignments '. Finally, we say that M is a
-model for a set H  w
o
() (M j= H) i M satises all A 2 H .
Lemma 3.25 (Truth and Falsity in -models). Let M := (D;@; E ; ) be a -model and '
an assignment. Furthermore let T
o
:= A
o
_ :(A
o
) for some A
o
2 w
o
and let F
o
:= :T
o
. Then
(E
'
(T
o
))  T and (E
'
(F
o
))  F.
Proof: We have (E
'
(T
o
))  T i (E
'
(A
o
_ :(A
o
)))  T. Evaluation shows that this
statement is equivalent to (E
'
(A))  T or (E
'
(A))  F, which is valid since ' : V
o
! D
o
and
 : D
o
! fT; Fg are total functions.
Note further that (E
'
(F
o
))  F evaluates to (E
'
(T
o
))  T which we already know.
Remark 3.26. Note that we only constrain the functional behavior of the values of the logical
constants. In particular this does not fully specify these values, since
 M need not be functional
 there can be more than two truth values.
Denition 3.27 (Properties f, q and b). Given a -model M = (D;@; E ; ), we say that M
has property
f i M is functional.
q i for all  2 T there is a function q

2 D
!!o
, such that for all a; b 2 D

holds
(q

@a@b)  T i a  b.
b i D
o
has at most two elements. Note that D
o
must always have at least the two elements
E
'
(T
o
) and E
'
(F
o
) by Lemma 3.25, so we can assume without loss of generality that
D
o
 fE
'
(F
o
)  F; E
'
(T
o
)  Tg and that  is the identity function
Denition 3.28 (Specialized -model Classes). We dene special classes of -models de-
pending on the validity of the properties f, q and b. Thus we obtain M
q
;M
b
;M
f
;M
fb
by requiring
that the properties specied in the index are valid.
Remark 3.29. We do not introduce M
fq
, as we will see later (Lemma 3.37) that q implies f and
hence that M
q
=M
fq
.
As Peter Andrews has noted in [And72a], Leon Henkin unintendedly introducedM
fb
in [Hen50]
instead of Henkin models in the sense below. A M
fb
does not necessarily have property q and as
Andrews has shown in [And72a], a consequence is, that a M
fb
may lack the principle of functional
extensionality EXT
!
L
, which he corrected by introducing property q.
Denition 3.30 (-Henkin models). A functional -model is called a -Henkin model
(H :=M
qb
), i it has properties q and b. If furthermore, all domains D
!
are full then we
call H a -standard model (ST).
Now let us extend the notion of a quotient structure to -models.
Denition 3.31 (Quotient -model). Let M := (D;@; E ; ) be a -model,  a congruence
on the corresponding -structure A := (D;@; E), and A=

be the quotient -structure of
A := (D;@; E) modulo  as dened in 3.12.
If (A)  (B) for all A;B 2 w
o
() with A  B, then  is called a congruence for M.
Then M=

:= (D

;@

; E

; 

) is called the quotient -model of M modulo , if 

([[a]]) 
(a) for all a 2 D
o
.
Remark 3.32. Note the importance of the additional requirement for functional congruence rela-
tions stated in 3.31. Without this requirement the quotient -models are not well-dened.
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Lemma 3.33. Let M be a -model and  be a congruence for M, then M=

j=
'
H  w
o
(),
i M j=
'
H.
Proof: Let A
o
2 H . We have 

(E

'
(A
o
))  

([[E
'
(A
o
)]])  (E
'
(A
o
))  T since M j= H .
3.5 Leibniz Equality
Denition 3.34 (Full Extensionality). We call the following formula schemata
EXT
!
L
:= 8F
!
8G
!
(8X

FX
:
= GX)) F
:
=

G
EXT
o
L
:= 8A
o
8B
o
(A, B), A
:
=
o
B
the axioms of full extensionality for Leibniz equality; we refer to the rst as axiom of
functional extensionality and to the latter formula as the extensionality axiom for truth
values. Note that EXT
!
L
species functionality of the relation denoted by the Leibniz formula
:
=. We will use the terms functionality and extensionality interchangeably.
Lemma 3.35 (Leibniz Equality in -models). Let M := (D;@; E ; ) be a -model and ' be
an assignment.
1. If E
'
(A)  E
'
(B), then (E
'
(A
:
=

B)  T.
2. If M is a M
b
and (E
'
(A
:
=
o
B))  T, then E
'
(A)  E
'
(B).
3. If M is a M
q
and (E
'
(A
:
=

B))  T, then E
'
(A)  E
'
(B).
Proof: Let a; b 2 D

and  := '; [a=X ]; [b=Y ].
1. We show that (E
'
(Q

)@a@b)  T if a  b, which entails the assertion. By denition
E
'
(Q

)  E
'
(X Y 8P PX ) PY ) and thus E
'
(Q

)@a@b  E
 
(8P PX ) PY ). Now
let r 2 D
!o
, then (E
 ;[r=P ]
(PX))  r@a  F or (E
 ;[r=P ]
(PY ))  r@b  r@a  T, since
 is total and a  b. So we see that (E
'
(Q)@a@b)  (E
 ;[r=P ]
(PX ) PY ))  T for all
r 2 D
!o
, which yields the assertion.
2. First note that by property b we have D
o
 fT; Fg and  is the identity function on D
o
.
Let us assume that (E
'
(A
:
=
o
B))  E
 
(8P PA ) PB)  T but E
'
(A) 6 E
'
(B),
which means that either E
'
(A)  T and E
'
(B)  F or vice a versa. In the rst case we
choose a predicate r := E
'
(X
o
X
o
) and get from the rst assumption that E
';[r=P ]
(PA) 
E
';[r=P ]
(A)  E
'
(A)  F or E
';[r=P ]
(PB)  E
';[r=P ]
(B)  E
'
(B)  T, which gives us the
contradiction. Note that P does not occur free in A or B by denition of
:
=.
The second case is analogous with r := E
'
(X
o
:X
o
).
3. We show that if (E
'
(Q

)@a@b)  T then a  b, which entails the assertion. Sup-
pose a 6 b 2 D

and r  q

@a where q

2 D
!!o
is the function guaranteed
by property q. We know that q

@a@a  T and q

@a@b  F, since a 6 b by as-
sumption. Hence (E
'
(Q

)@a@b)  (E
 
(8P PX ) PY )  F for  := '; [a=X ]; [b=Y ],
since (E
 ;[r=P ]
(PX ) PY ))  F, as (E
 ;[r=P ]
(PX))  q

@a@a  r@a  T and
(E
 ;[r=P ]
(PY ))  q

@a@b  r@b  F.
Lemma 3.36 (Extensionality in -models).
1. There exists a M which is not functional.
2. There exists a M
fb
for which EXT
!
L
is not valid.
3. There exists a M
q
for which EXT
o
L
is not valid.
4. EXT
!
L
is valid in M, if M is a M
q
.
5. EXT
o
L
is valid in M, if M is a M
b
.
As a consequence the following table characterizes the dierent properties of the introduced se-
mantical structures. If a formula is valid for a certain semantical structure we use a `+' and
a ` ' otherwise. Each entry is further marked with a justication referring to one of the above
statements.
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valid in M/M
f
M
q
M
b
/M
fb
M
qb
EXT
!
L
 
(2)
+
(4)
 
(2)
+
(4)
EXT
o
L
 
(3)
 
(3)
+
(5)
+
(5)
Proof: For the proof of 1. note that -models need not to be functional (see also remark 3.26).
In the model existence theorem 4.28(Acc
M
) we will later explicitly constructs a functional -model
based on the termstructure TS()

. For TS()

we already know by remark 3.16 that it is not
functional.
For the proof of 2. we refer to [And72a], where Andrews constructs a functional -Model
(actually a M
fb
) which lacks the principle of functional extensionality of Leibnizequality.
For 3. note that EXT
o
L
can only be valid if D
o
= fo; g, which is not required for M
q
's. For a
concrete example of a M
q
which lacks EXT
o
L
see 4.28(Acc
M
q
).
Next we consider 4.: Let  := '; [f=F ]; [g=G]. From V
 
(8A

FA
:
= GA)  T we get that for
all a 2 D

V
 ;[a=A]
(FA
:
= GA)  T. By lemma 3.35(3) we can conclude that E
 ;[a=A]
(FA) 
E
 ;[a=A]
(GA) for all a 2 D

and hence E
 ;[a=A]
(F )@E
 ;[a=A]
(A)  E
 ;[a=A]
(G)@E
 ;[a=A]
(A). The
application of functionality leads to E
 
(F )  E
 
(G) which nally gives us that V
 
(F
:
=
!
G)  T
with lemma 3.35(1).
And nally in 5. +we have that for all a; b 2 D
o
and all assignments ' (E
';[a=A][b=B]
(A ,
B))  T, i (E
';[a=A][b=B]
(A))  (E
';[a=A][b=B]
(B)). From b we further know that  is the identity
function and hence this statement is valid, i E
';[a=A][b=B]
(A)  E
';[a=A][b=B]
(B) from which we get
the assertion by lemma 3.35(1).
We are now in a good position to prove the assertion that property q implies property f stated
in remark 3.29. Thus the next lemma shows that requiring property q automatically introduces f
and hence there cannot be a distinction between M
q
's and M
fq
's.
Lemma 3.37 (q implies f). Let M be a -model with property q. Then M has property f.
Proof: LetM = (D;@; E ; ) be aM
q
and let ' :=  ; [f=F ]; [g=G] for an arbitrary assignment  
and arbitrary f; g 2 D
!
. We show that if for all a 2 D

holds that E
';[a=X]
(FX)  E
';[a=X]
(GX)
then E
'
(F )  E
'
(G), which entails the assertion. From E
';[a=X]
(FX)  E
';[a=X]
(GX) for all
a 2 D

we get with Lemma 3.35(1) that (E
';[a=X]
(FX
:
= GX))  T for all a 2 D

and hence
that (E
'
(8X

FX
:
= GX))  T. We can apply EXT
!
L
, which is valid in M by 3.36(4), and
thus we get that (E
'
(F
:
= G))  T. Now the conclusion follows by Lemma 3.35(3).
Next we discuss the role of Leibniz equality within the dierent semantic structures.
Theorem 3.38 (Properties of Leibniz Equality). Let M be a -model. For all assignments
' and all terms A;B;C 2 w

() and F;G 2 w
!
() we have:
M E
'
(
:
=

) is an equivalence relation on D

with respect to . In particular:
re (E
'
(A
:
=

A))  T.
sy If (E
'
(A
:
=

B))  T, then (E
'
(B
:
=

A))  T.
tr If (E
'
(A
:
=

B))  T and (E
'
(B
:
=

C))  T, then (E
'
(A
:
=

C))  T.
M
f
If M is a M
f
, then E
'
(
:
=

) is a congruence relation on D

with respect to . In partic-
ular:
co If (E
'
(A
:
=

B))  T then (E
'
(FA
:
=

FB))  T.
M
q
If M is a M
q
, then E
'
(
:
=

) is a functional congruence relation on D

with respect to .
In particular:
fu (E
'
(F
:
=
!
G))  T if (E
'
(FA
:
=

FA))  T for all A 2 w

.
M
qb
If M is a H, then E
'
(
:
=

) is the equality relation on D

.
Proof:
M re: (E
'
(A
:
=

A))  T, i for all p 2 D
!o
we have (E
';[p=P ]
(PA))  F or
(E
';[p=P ]
(PA))  T which is obvious since  is total and surjective.
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Figure 2: The landscape of Higher-Order Semantics with primitive equality
sy: Suppose (E
'
(A
:
=

B))  T but (E
'
(B
:
=

A))  F. From the latter we get
that (E
';[p=P ]
(PB))  T and (E
';[p=P ]
(PA))  F for some p 2 D
!o
. Without loss of
generality, let p := E
'
(V ) for a fresh variable V 2 
!o
. From the former assumption
we know that for all q 2 D
!o
holds (E
';[q=P ]
(PA))  F or (E
';[q=P ]
(PB))  T and
hence (E
';[E
'
(X V X)=P ]
(PA))  F or (E
';[E
'
(X VX)=P ]
(PB))  T which is equivalent
with (E
';[p=P ]
(PA))  T or (E
';[p=P ]
(PB))  F and contradicts the latter assumption.
tr: Similar to sy.
M
f
co: Suppose (E
'
(F
:
=
!
G))  T but (E
'
(FA
:
=

GA))  F. From the latter we get
that (E
';[p=P ]
(P (FA)))  T and (E
';[p=P ]
(P (GA)))  F for some p 2 D
!o
. Without
loss of generality let p := E
'
(V ) for a fresh variable V 2 V
!o
. From the former assump-
tion we know that for all q 2 D
!o
holds (E
';[q=Q]
(QF))  F or (E
';[q=Q]
(QG))  T
and hence (E
';[E
'
(X V (XA))=P ]
(PF))  F or (E
';[E
'
(X V (XA))=P ]
(PF))  T which is
equivalent with (E
';[p=P ]
(P (FA)))  F or (E
';[p=P ]
(P (GA)))  T and contradicts the
former assumption.
M
q
fu: A direct consequence of lemma 3.36(4).
M
qb
By property b we know that  is the identity relation on D
o
and thus we have that
:
=
denotes a relation for which the principles reexivity, symmetry, transitivity, congruence
and functionality hold. Hence
:
= denotes the equality relation.
3.6 Primitive Equality
The situation of higher-order semantics becomes much simpler if we introduce equality as a prim-
itive logical constant = in , which we will assume for the rest of this section. Since = is logical,
we have to specialize the notion of -valuation (cf. 3.24) by requiring that (E(=

)@a@b)  T, i
a  b. In this case, we call  a -valuation with equality.
Furthermore, we say that a -model M has property e, i for all a; b 2 D

we have
(E(=

)@a@b)  T, i a  b.
A (functional) -model, which has property e is called a (functional) -model with full
equality (M
e
) and a functional one with additional property b is called a -Henkin model
with full equality (M
eb
).
Clearly, property e entails property q, since E(=

) is the function required in property q.
And we already know that property q implies property f, it is easy to see that the landscape of
higher-order semantics from gure 1 collapses to one in gure 2.
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The connection between property q and e is already discussed in [And72a]. Andrews concludes
that it seems natural to require the existence of logical connectives =

in the signature, if one
is interested in extensionality. In this paper we are especially interested to shed some light on
both: in extensionality of Leibniz equality in case =

=2  and in extensionality of Leibniz equality
and/or primitive equality in case =

2 .
Denition 3.39 (Extensionality). Analogous to the extensionality Axioms for Leibniz equality,
we can dene such for primitive equality.
EXT
!
:= 8F
!
8G
!
(8X

FX = GX)) F =

G
EXT
o
:= 8A
o
8B
o
(A, B), A =
o
B
the axioms of full extensionality for primitive equality.
The following lemma shows that in a -model with full equality the denotations of primitive
equations and corresponding Leibniz equations are identical modulo .
Lemma 3.40 (Primitive and Leibniz equality). If M := (D;@; E ; ) 2 M
e
, then (E
'
(A =
B))  (E
'
(A
:
= B)) for all A;B 2 w().
Proof: By lemma 3.35(3) we have (E
'
(A
:
= B))  T, i E
'
(A)  E
'
(B), since M
e
M
q
. By
property e this is equivalent with (E
'
(A = B))  T.
Lemma 3.41 (Extensionality in -models with full equality).
1. There exists a M
e
which is not functional.
2. There exists a M
e
for which EXT
o
and EXT
o
L
are not valid.
3. EXT
!
and EXT
!
L
are valid in M, if M is a M
e
4. EXT
o
and EXT
o
is valid in M, if M is a M
eb
.
Thus we can extend the table in Lemma 3.36 to the following one:
valid in M
e
M
eb
EXT
!
L
;EXT
!
+ +
EXT
o
L
;EXT
o
  +
Proof:
1. The argumentation is analogous to 3.36(1) and a concrete example of a non-functional M
e
is given in 4.28(M
e
).
2. The argumentation is analogous to 3.36(2) and 3.36(3). A concrete example of a M
e
which
lacks EXT
o
L
and EXT
o
is provided by 4.28(M
e
).
3. Note that the only crucial points in the proof of 3.36(4) are functionality, which is given
here as well, and the application of lemmata 3.35(1) and 3.35(3). Since a M
e
is also a M
q
both lemmata are applicable here as well and thus for
:
= we get the statement immediately.
For = the statement can be proven analogously to 3.36(4) using property e instead of the
lemmata 3.35(1) and 3.35(3).
4. In the proof of 3.36(5) the only crucial parts are the usage of property b and lemma 3.35(1).
Again for
:
= there is nothing to show, since a M
eb
is also a M
fb
. The statement for = can
be proven analogously with property e instead of lemma 3.35(1).
Theorem 3.42. Let M 2 M
e
, then E
'
(
:
=

) and E
'
(=

) are equivalence relations on D

with
respect to  for all assignments '. If M is a M
eb
, then E
'
(
:
=

) = E
'
(=

) is the equality relation
on D

.
Proof: Note that for
:
= the proofs are provided by lemma 3.38, sinceM
e
M
q
andM
eb
M
qb
.
Thus it remains to verify the statements for =. Let M 2 M
e
, then reexivity, symmetry and
transitivity follow from their
:
=-counterparts by lemma 3.40. Functionality is a direct consequence
of lemma 3.41(3) and co follows from the functionality of a M
e
together with property e.
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IfM2M
eb
, then the argumentation for both,
:
= and =, is analogous to 3.41(M
qb
): By property
b we know that  is the identity relation on D
o
and thus we have that
:
= and = denote relations for
which the principles reexivity, symmetry, transitivity, congruence and functionality hold. Hence
both,
:
= and =, denote the equality relation, since the fact that therer are only two truth values
does not leave any room for other relations with these properties.
4 Model Existence Theorems
In this section we introduce the model existence theorems for the dierent semantical
notions discussed in section 3. These theorems have the following form, where  2
fM;M
b
;M
f
;M
q
;M
fb
;M
qb
M
e
;M
eb
g:
Theorem (Model Existence): For a given abstract consistency class Acc

and a set
H 2 Acc

there is a -model of H .
The most important tools used in the proofs of the model existence theorems are the so-called
-Hintikka sets. These sets are maximal elements in abstract consistency classes, and allow
computations that resemble those in the considered semantical structures (e.g. -Henkin models).
These allow to construct -valuations for the term structures that turn those into -models.
The key step in the proof of the model existence theorems is an extension lemma, which
guarantees a -Hintikka set H for any set H of sentences in  

. With this, the proofs for the
model existence theorems are uniform.
4.1 Abstract Consistency
Let us now review a few technicalities that we will need for the proofs of the model existence
theorems.
Denition 4.1 (Compactness). Let C be a class of sets.
1. C is called closed under subsets, i for all sets S and T the following condition holds: if
S  T and T 2 C, then S 2 C.
2. C is called compact i for every set S the following condition holds: S 2 C, i every nite
subset of S is a member of C.
Lemma 4.2. If C is compact, then C is closed under subsets.
Proof: Suppose S  T and T 2 C. Every nite subset A of S is a nite subset of T , and since
C is compact, we know that A 2 C. Thus S 2 C.
Denition 4.3 (Suciently Pure). Let  be a signature and T be a set of -sentences. T is
called suciently -pure, i for each type  there is a set of constants P

 

with equal
cardinality to w

(), such that the elements of P do not occur in T .
We will always presuppose that sets of sets of sentences are suciently -pure in order to
have enough witness constants. This can be obtained in practice by enriching the signature with
spurious constants. Another way would be to use specially marked variables (which may never be
instantiated) as in [Koh94b].
Denition 4.4 (Properties for Abstract Consistency Classes). Let  

be a class of sets
of -sentences. We need the following conditions, where A;B 2 cw
o
() and F;G 2
cw
!
():
10
r
c
If A is atomic, then A =2  or :A =2 .
r
:
If ::A 2 , then  A 2  

.
10
In the following we will use ' A as an abbreviation for ' [ fAg.
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r

If A 2  and B is the -normal form of A, then B  2  

.
r
f
If A 2  and B is the -normal form of A, then B  2  

.
r
_
If A _B 2 , then  A 2  

or  B 2  

.
r
^
If :(A _B) 2 , then  [ f:A;:Bg 2  

.
r
8
If 

F 2 , then  FW 2  

for each W 2 cw

().
r
9
If :

F 2 , then  :(Fw) 2  

for any constant w 2 

, which does not occur in .
r
b
If :(A
:
=
o
B) 2 , then  [ fA;:Bg 2  

or  [ f:A;Bg 2  

.
r
q
If :(F
:
=
!
G) 2 , then   :(Fw
:
=

Gw) 2  

for any constant w 2 

, which
does not occur in .
(Additional abstract consistency conditions for primitive equality will be introduced later in sec-
tion 4.3.)
Remark 4.5. Note that for the connectives _;

there are two conditions { a positive and a
negative one { given in the denition above, namely r
_
/r
^
for _ and r
8
/r
9
for 

. For
:
=
o
and
:
=
!
the situation is dierent, as we need only conditions for the negative cases. The positive
cases can be inferred at level of Hintikka sets by expanding the Leibniz denition of equality (see
the proofs of r
q
0
in lemma 4.15 and r
b
0
in lemma 4.17).
Denition 4.6 (Abstract Consistency Classes). Let  be a signature  

be a class of sets
of -propositions. Using the properties from the previous denition we introduce the following
abstract consistency classes:
Acc
M
If r
c
;r
:
;r

;r
_
;r
^
;r
8
and r
9
are valid for  

, then  

is called an abstract
consistency class for -models (Acc
M
).
Based upon this denition we introduce the following specialized abstract consistency classes:
Acc
M
b
;Acc
M
f
;Acc
M
q
;Acc
M
fb
;Acc
M
qb
(= Acc
H
), where we indicate by indices which additional prop-
erties from fr
f
;r
q
;r
b
g are required.
Sometimes we do not want to dierentiate between the particular notions above. In this cases
we simply speak of an abstract consistency class, with which we refer to an arbitrary but one
in fAcc
M
;Acc
M
b
;Acc
M
f
;Acc
M
q
;Acc
M
fb
;Acc
M
qb
g.
Remark 4.7. Note that Acc
M
f
corresponds to the abstract consistency property discussed by An-
drews in [And71]. The only (technical) dierence is that Andrews does not consider -conversion
as built-into the logic but needs a condition similar to r

that requires -standardized forms to
be abstract consistent.
Lemma 4.8 (Non-atomic consistency). Let  

be an abstract consistency class and A 2
cw
o
(), then for all  2  

we have A =2  or :A =2 .
Proof: Let A 2 w
o
() and  2  

, such that A 2 . By r

, we can assume that A is a
-normal form. So we prove the assertion by an induction over the structure of A.
If A is atomic, then we get the assertion immediately by r
c
. If A is not atomic, then its head
must be a logical constant, therefore we can proceed by a case-analysis over the connectives and
quantiers.
Suppose A has the form :B and f:B;::Bg  . By r
:
we know that f:B;Bg [  2  

which contradicts the induction hypotheses. Now supposeA has the form B_C and fB_C;:(B_
C)g  . By r
_
, r
^
we know that fB _ C;:(B _ C);B;:B;:Cg [  2  

or fB _ C;:(B _
C);C;:B;:Cg [  2  

. In both cases the contradiction is given by the induction hypotheses.
Suppose A has the form (X B) and f(X B);:(X B)g  . By r
9
, r
8
and r

we know
that f(Y B);:(Y B); [W=Y ]B;:[W=Y ]Bg [  2  

which contradicts again the induction
hypotheses.
In contrast to [And71], we work with saturated abstract consistency classes in order to obtain
total -valuations, which makes the proofs of the model existence theorem much simpler and e.g.
yield much more natural models.
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Denition 4.9 (Saturated). We call an abstract consistency class  

atomically saturated,
i for all  2  

and for all atomic sentences A 2 cw
o
(), we have  A 2  

or   :A 2  

.
If this property holds for all sentences A 2 cw
o
(), then we call  

saturated.
Remark 4.10. Clearly, not all abstract consistency classes are saturated, since the empty set is
one that is not, even if  is empty.
In the denition of abstract consistency class, we only had to require atomic consistency, i.e.
that there are no atomic propositions that contradict each other in one abstract consistent set,
to ensure consistency (see 4.8). The authors conjecture that a similar theorem can be proven for
saturatedness:
Conjecture: Let  

be an atomic saturated abstract consistency class. Then there
exists an saturated abstract consistency class  
0

, with  

is a subclass of  
0

.
Such a result would be of practical importance, as it allows to reduce the problem of proving
saturatedness of a given calculus to proving atomic saturatedness.
Lemma 4.11. Let  

be a saturated abstract consistency class,  2  

and A an atomic sentence.
Then   (A _ :A) 2  

.
Proof: Since  

is saturated and  2  

, we must have   (A_:A) 2  

or  :(A_:A) 2
 

. We prove the assertion by refuting the second alternative. If   :(A _ :A) 2  

, then
 [ f:(A _ :A);:A;::A;Ag 2  

by r
^
and r
:
. Since A is an atomic sentence we get a
contradiction with lemma 4.8.
Lemma 4.12 (Compactness of abstract consistency classes). For each abstract consis-
tency class  

exists an abstract consistency class  
0

of the same type, such that  

  
0

, and
 
0

is compact. Furthermore  

is saturated, i  
0

is.
Proof: (following and extending [And86], proposition no. 2506)
We choose  
0

:= f  cw
o
()


every nite subset of  is in  

g. Now suppose that  2  

.  

is closed under subsets, so every nite subset of  is in  

and thus  2  
0

. Hence  

  
0

.
Next let us show that each  
0

is compact. Suppose  2  
0

and 	 is an arbitrary nite subset
of . By denition of  
0

all nite subsets of  are in  

and therefore 	 2  
0

. Thus all nite
subsets of  are in  
0

whenever  is in  
0

. On the other hand, suppose all nite subsets of  are
in  
0

. Then by the denition of  
0

the nite subsets of  are also in  

, so  2  
0

. Thus  
0

is
compact.
Next we show that if  

satises r

, then  
0

satises r

, by considering the cases of deni-
tion 4.6. First note that by lemma 4.2 we have that  
0

is closed under subsets.
r
c
Let  2  
0

and suppose there is an atomA such that fA;:Ag  . Then fA;:Ag 2  

contradicting r
c
.
r
:
Let  2  
0

, ::A 2 , 	 be any nite subset of  A and  := (	 n fAg)  ::A.  is
a nite subset of , so  2  

. Since  

is an abstract consistency class and ::A 2 ,
we get  A 2  

by r
:
. We know that 	    A and  

is closed under subsets,
so 	 2  

. Thus every nite subset 	 of   A is in  

and therefore by denition
 A 2  
0

.
r

;r
f
;r
_
;r
^
;r
8
;r
9
Analogous to r
:
.
r
q
Let  2  
0

, :(F
:
=
!
G) 2  and 	 be any nite subset of   :(FW
:
= GW).
We show that 	 2  

. Clearly  := (	 n f:(FW
:
= GW)g)  :(F
:
= G) is a nite
subset of  and therefore  2  

. Since  

satises r
q
and :(F
:
= G) 2 , we have
  :(FW
:
= GW) 2  

by r
q
. Furthermore, 	    :(FW
:
= GW) and  

is closed
under subsets, so 	 2  

. Thus every nite subset 	 of   :(FW
:
= GW) is in  

,
therefore by denition we have   :(FW
:
= GW) 2  
0

.
r
b
Let  2  
0

with :(A
:
= B) 2  but [fA;:Bg =2  and [f:A;Bg =2 . Then there
exists nite subsets 
1
and 
2
of  such that 
1
 fA;:Bg =2  

and 
2
 f:A;Bg =2
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 

. Now we choose 
3
:= 
1
[ 
2
 :(A
:
= B). Obviously 
3
is a nite subset of
 and therefore 
3
2  

. Since  

satises r
b
, we have that 
3
[ fA;:Bg 2  

or

3
[f:A;Bg 2  

. From this and the fact that extensional abstract consistency classes
are closed under subsets we get that 
1
[ fA;:Bg 2  

or 
2
[ f:A;Bg 2  

, which
contradicts our assumption.
For the proof that  
0

is saturated, let  2  
0

, but neither   A nor   :A be in  
0

. Then
there are nite subsets 
+
and 
 
of  such that 
+
A =2  

and 
 
 :A =2  

(since all nite
subsets of  are in  

). As 	 := 
+
[ 
 
is a nite subset of , we have 	 2  

. Furthermore,
	 A 2  

or 	  :A 2  

, because  

is saturated.  

is closed under subsets, so 
+
A 2  

or 
 
 :A 2  

. This is a contradiction, so we can conclude that if  2  

, then  A 2  
0

or
  :A 2  
0

.
4.2 Hintikka Sets
Now, we dene Hintikka sets, which are maximal elements in an abstract consistency class. Hin-
tikka sets connect syntax with semantics, as they provide the basis for the model constructions in
the model existence theorem 4.28.
Denition 4.13 (-Hintikka Set). Let  

be an abstract consistency class, then a set H is
called a -Hintikka set for  

, i it is maximal in  

, i.e. i for each sentence D 2 cw
o
()
such that H D 2  

, we already have D 2 H.
In the following we discuss properties of -Hintikka sets. Since we have dierent types of
abstract consistency classes, depending on the additional requirements f; q and b, we have to
discuss dierent Hintikka lemmata.
Theorem 4.14 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
and H is maximal in
 

, then the following statements hold for all A;B 2 cw
o
(), F 2 cw
!o
() and C;D;E 2
cw

():
r
c
a
A =2 H or :A =2 H.
r
c
b A 2 H, i :A =2 H.
r
c
c
:A 2 H, i A =2 H.
r
:
(::A) 2 H, i A 2 H.
r

If A

$

B, then A 2 H, i B 2 H.
r
_
(A _B) 2 H, i A 2 H or B 2 H.
r
^
:(A _B) 2 H, i :A 2 H and :B 2 H.
r
8


F 2 H, i for each D 2 cw

() we have FD 2 H.
r
9
:

F 2 H, i there is a D 2 cw

() such that :FD 2 H.
r
:
=
r
A
:
=

A 2 H
r
:
=
c
If F[C]
p
2 H and C
:
=

D 2 H, then F[D]
p
2 H
r
:
=
sy
C
:
=

D 2 H, i D
:
=

C 2 H
r
:
=
tr
C
:
=

D 2 H and D
:
=

E 2 H, then C
:
=

E 2 H
r
t
(A _ :A) 2 H for any sentence A.
Proof:
r
c
a
By 4.8.
r
c
b
,r
c
c
Both are direct consequences of the saturation of  

and r
c
a
.
r
:
If ::A 2 H, then H A 2  

by r
:
. The maximality of H now gives us that A 2 H.
To obtain the converse, let us assume that A 2 H. Then by r
c
b
we know that :A =2 H
and by r
c
c
::A 2 H.
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r

Suppose A

$

B. Since -reduction is terminating and conuent there is unique C
such that C is the -normal-form of A and B. Without loss of generality we show that
if A 2 H, then B 2 H. For that we suppose that A 2 H but B =2 H. From the latter we
get by by r
c
c
that :B 2 H. Note that the -normal-form of A is C and of :B is :C.
By r

and the maximality of H we know that fC;:Cg 2 H which contradicts r
c
a
.
r
_
We get the rst direction by r
_
and the the maximality of H. For the converse direction
let us assume that A 2 H or B 2 H but (A_B) =2 H. Then by r
c
c
we get :(A_B) 2 H
and by the rst direction ofr
^
we have f:A;:Bg  H which contradicts the assumption
with r
c
a
.
r
^
Analogous to the r
_
case; Note that the argumentation is not circular. In both cases we
use the forward direction of the counterpart to verify the backward direction, whereas
forward directions are proven directly. The same holds for the proofs of r
8
and r
9
below.
r
8
Again, we get the rst direction by r
8
and the maximality of H. For the converse
direction let us assume that FD 2 H for each D 2 cw

(), but 

F =2 H. Then
by r
c
c
:

F 2 H and by the rst direction of r
9
there is a D 2 cw

(), such that
:FD 2 H which is a contradiction.
r
9
Analogous to r
8
.
r
:
=
r
Suppose A
:
=

A =2 H. By r
c
b , the denition of
:
=, r
9
and r
b
we have :(:QA_QA)) 2
H for a Q 2 cw
!o
(). Applying r
^
contradicts r
c
b .
r
:
=
c
Suppose F[C]
p
2 H and C
:
= D 2 H. From the latter we obtain (P :PC _
PD)(X F[X ]
p
) 2 H by the denition of
:
= and r
8
. Note that X is free for F[Y ]
p
so we have :F[C]
p
_F[D]
p
2 H by r

. From this we conclude with r
_
that :F[C]
p
2 H
or F[D]
p
2 H. Since the rst option contradicts our assumption with r
c
a
, it must be
the case that F[B]
p
2 H.
r
:
=
sy
By r
:
=
r
and r
:
=
c
.
r
:
=
tr
By r
:
=
r
, r
:
=
c
and r
:
=
sy
.
r
t
Saturation of  

and maximality of H entails that A 2 H or :A 2 H. We now get the
assertion by r
_
.
Depending on the kind of abstract consistency class we are considering, Hintikka sets have
dierent properties. We discuss this dierent properties in the Hintikka lemmata below.
Theorem 4.15 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
f
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
f
and H is maximal in
 

, then for all A;B;C 2 cw
o
()
r
f
If A

$

B, then A 2 H i B 2 H.
Proof: Analogous to r

in lemma 4.14
Theorem 4.16 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
q
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
q
and H is maximal
in  

, then for all C 2 cw

(), F;G 2 cw
!
():
r
q
:(F
:
=
!
G) 2 H, i there is a C 2 cw

(), such that :(FC
:
=

GC) 2 H.
r
q
0
F
:
=
!
G 2 H, i FC
:
=

GC 2 H for all C 2 cw

()
Proof:
r
q
We get the rst direction by the denition of
:
=, r
q
and the maximality of H. For the
converse let us suppose that :(FC
:
= GC) 2 H but :(F
:
= G) =2 H. From the latter
we know by r
c
b , that F
:
= G 2 H and by r
:
=
c
we have that :(GC
:
= GC) 2 H which
contradicts r
:
=
r
and r
c
a
.
r
q
0
Suppose F
:
= G 2 H but FC
:
= GC =2 H which means by r
c
c
, that :(FC
:
= GC) 2 H.
From this we get by the denition of
:
=, r
9
and r

, that :(:Q(FC) _ Q(GC)) 2 H
for some Q 2 w
!o
(). On the other hand we know from F
:
= G 2 H by the
denition of
:
= and r
8
that (P
(!)!o
:PF _ PG)(X
!
Q(XC)) 2 H, and hence
by r

that :Q(FC)_Q(GC) 2 H which contradicts r
c
a
. For the converse assume that
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FC
:
= GC 2 H for all C 2 H but F
:
= G =2 H. We get by r
c
c
that :(F
:
= G) 2 H
which contradicts the assumption with r
q
and r
c
a
.
Theorem 4.17 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
b
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
b
and H is maximal
in  

, then for all A;B 2 w
o
():
r
b
:(A
:
=
o
B) 2 H, i f:A;Bg  H or fA;:Bg  H
r
b
0
(A
:
=
o
B) 2 H, i fA;Bg  H or f:A;:Bg  H.
r
:
=
i
(A, B) 2 H, i (A
:
=
o
B) 2 H.
r
:
=
tc
Either A
:
=
o
B 2 H or A
:
=
o
:B 2 H.
r
:
=
tf :(T
o
:
= F
o
) 2 H, if T
o
and F
o
are dened as in lemma 3.25.
r
:
=
tf
0
Either A
:
=
o
T
o
2 H or A
:
=
o
F
o
2 H.
Proof:
r
b
We get the rst direction by the denition of
:
=, r
b
and the maximality of H. Now
assume that f:A;Bg  H or fA;:Bg  H but :(A
:
= B) =2 H. From the latter we
know by the denition of
:
= and r
8
that f(P
o!o
:PA _ PB)(X
o
X); (P
o!o
:PA _
PB)(X
o
:X)g  H and by r

and r
_
that one of f:A;::Ag, fB;:Bg, f:A;:Bg
or fB;::Ag must be a subset of H. All four cases contradict r
c
a
.
r
b
0
Since  

is saturated we have A 2 H or :A 2 H. From this we easily get the rst
direction by r
:
=
c
. For the converse suppose that fA;Bg 2 H or f:A;:Bg 2 H but
(A
:
= B) =2 H which means by r
c
c
that :(A
:
= B) 2 H. By r
b
we have f:A;Bg 2 H
or fA;:Bg 2 H. In each of the four cases the contradiction follows by r
c
a
.
r
:
=
i
If we assume (A , B) 2 H, then by the denition of , and r
^
we have f:A _
B;A _ :Bg  H, and by r
_
that f:A;Ag  H or f:B;Bg  H or f:A;:Bg  H or
fA;Bg  H. Note that the rst two alternatives are impossible because of r
c
a
. Now
we assume that A
:
= B =2 H from which we obtain by r
c
c
and r
b
that f:A;Bg  H or
fA;:Bg  H. We have to consider four cases and in each case we get a contradiction
with r
c
a
.
r
:
=
tc
Assume that A
:
= B =2 H and A
:
= :B =2 H. By r
c
c
we have :(A
:
= B) 2 H and
:(A
:
= :B) 2 H, and by r
b
we get from the former that f:A;Bg  H or fA;:Bg  H
and from the latter that fA;:Bg  H or f:A;::Bg  H. We have to consider four
cases and in each we get a contradiction with r
c
a
. Analogous we can show with r
b
0
that
A
:
= B 2 H and A
:
= :B 2 H leads to a contradiction.
r
:
=
tf From r
t
we know that T
o
2 H. Hence by r
c
b and r
c
c
that :F
o
2 H and nally by r
b
we get :(T
o
:
=
o
F
o
) 2 H.
r
:
=
tf
0
Follows immediately from r
:
=
tc
.
4.3 Primitive Equality
Next we will introduce abstract consistency properties for primitive equality. We have dierent
options, e.g. we could introduce primitive equality by postulating = to be a functional congruence
relation or alternatively we could state properties connecting = with
:
=.
Our concrete choice, namely a property postulating reexivity and substitutivity of =, is
motivated from a practical point of view, as we believe that reexivity and substitutivity are more
easy to verify in practical applications.
Denition 4.18 (Abstract Consistency with Primitive Equality). Let  be signature and
let  

be a Acc
M
, then we dene the following condition, where  2  

:
r
e
(r) :(A =

A) =2 
(s) if F[A]
p
2  and A = B 2 , then  F[B]
p
2  

Using this properties we introduce the following abstract consistency classes Acc
M
e
and Acc
M
eb
based upon the denition of an Acc
M
.
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Remark 4.19. Just as in the case with Leibniz equality, we can extend a abstract consistency class
with primitive equality so that it is compact.
Proof: We proceed just as in the proof of Lemma 4.12 but check the cases for r
e
(r) and r
e
(s).
For r
e
(r) let  2  
0

and suppose there is an A 2 w
o
() with :(A = A) 2 . Then
f:(A = A)g 2  

contradicting r
e
(r).
For r
e
(s) Let  2  
0

, fF[A]
p
;A = Bg  , 	 be any nite subset of  F[B]
p
and  := (	 n
fF[B]
p
g) [ fF[A]
p
;A = Bg.  is a nite subset of , so  2  

. Since  

is an Acc
M
eb
and
fF[A]
p
;A = Bg  , we get   F[B]
p
2  

by r
e
(s). We know that 	    F[B]
p
and  

is
closed under subsets, so 	 2  

. Thus every nite subset 	 of  F[B]
p
is in  

and therefore by
denition  F[B]
p
2  
0

.
The next lemma discusses the connection between Leibniz equality and primitive equality in
case we are considering an Acc
M
e
.
Lemma 4.20 (Leibniz vs. Primitive Equality). Let  

be a saturated Acc
M
e
. For all  2  

,
all A;B 2 w
o
() and F;G 2 w
!
() holds:
1. If :(A
:
=

B) 2  then   :(A =

B) 2  

2. If :(A =

B) 2  then   :(A
:
=

B) 2  

3. If A
:
=

B 2  then  A =

B 2  

4. If A =

B 2  then  A
:
=

B 2  

5. If :(F =
!
G) 2  then   :(Fw =

Gw) 2  

for any constant w 2 

, which does
not occur in .
Proof:
1. Suppose :(A
:
=

B) 2  but   :(A =

B) =2  

. Since  

is saturated we have
 A =

B 2  

and by r
e
(s), that  A =

B  :(B
:
=

B) 2  

. From the denition of
:
= we further conclude with r
9
that  A =

B  :(B
:
=

B)  :(:pB _ pB) 2  

for any
constant p 2 
!o
. From this we get the contradiction with r
^
and lemma 4.8.
2. Suppose :(A =

B) 2  but  :(A
:
=

B) =2  

. Since  

is saturated we have  A
:
=

B 2  

and by denition of
:
=, r
8
and the subset closure of  

that   (P
!o
:PA _
PB)(X

A = X) 2  

. By r

, r
_
and the subset closure of  

we nally get that
  :(A = A) 2  

or   A = B 2  

. The former is contradictory with r
e
(r) and
lemma 4.8, and the latter with the assumption :(A =

B) 2  and lemma 4.8.
3. Suppose A
:
=

B 2  but  A =

B =2  

. Since  

is saturated we have   :(A =

B) 2  

and by (2) and the subset closure of  

that :(A
:
=

B) 2  

which contradicts
the assumption with lemma 4.8.
4. Analogous to (3) with (1).
5. From :(F =
!
B) 2  we can derive with (2), r
q
, (1) and the subset closure of  

that
  :(FC =
!
BC) 2  

.
Remark 4.21. Lemma 4.20 shows that in an M
e
the symbol = denes the same relation as
:
=,
namely a functional congruence relation modulo . And if we are considering an M
eb
then both
describe the equality relation. This shows that the conditions r
e
(r) and r
e
(s) are sucient for this
purpose. We could alternatively introduce primitive equality by requiring the statements 1. and
2. of lemma 4.20, but this would lead to more complicated proof obligations when proving the
completeness of calculi with primitive equality.
We now discuss two new Hintikka lemmata, which take the logical nature of = into account
Theorem 4.22 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
e
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
e
and H is maximal
in  

, then the following statements hold for all A;B;C 2 w

(), F;G 2 w
!
() and
D;E 2 w
o
():
r
=
r
(A =

A) 2 H.
r
=
c
If D[A]
p
2 H and A =

B 2 H, then D[B]
p
2 H.
r
=
sy
A =

B 2 H, i (B =

A) 2 H.
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r
=
tr
A =

B 2 H and B =

C 2 H, then A =

C 2 H
r
=
q
:(F =
!
G) 2 H, i there is a C 2 w

(), such that :(FC =

GC) 2 H.
r
=
q
0
F =
!
G 2 H, i FC =

GC 2 H for all C 2 w

().
r
=
:
=
A
:
=

B 2 H, i A =

B 2 H.
r
=
:
=
0
:(A
:
=

B) 2 H, i :(A =

B) 2 H.
Proof:
r
=
r
Follows by r
e
(r) and r
c
b .
r
=
c
By maximality of H and r
e
(s).
r
=
sy
,r
=
tr
By r
=
r
and r
=
c
r
=
:
=
By maximality of H, 4.20(3.) and 4.20(4.)
r
=
:
=
0
By maximality of H, 4.20(1.) and 4.20(2.)
r
=
q
Follows from r
q
with r
=
:
=
.
r
=
q
0
Follows from r
q
with r
=
:
=
0
.
Theorem 4.23 (Hintikka Lemma for Acc
M
eb
). If  

is a saturated Acc
M
eb
and H is maximal
in  

, then for all A;B 2 w
o
():
r
=
b :(A =
o
B) 2 H, i f:A;Bg  H or fA;:Bg  H.
r
=
b
0
A =
o
B 2 H, i fA;Bg  H or f:A;:Bg  H.
r
=
i
A, B 2 H, i A = B 2 H.
r
=
tc
Either A = B 2 H or A = :B 2 H.
Proof: The statements follow direct from their counterparts r
b
{ r
:
=
tc
in lemma 4.17 with the
help of r
=
:
=
and r
=
:
=
0
.
4.4 Model Existence
Next we come to the proof of the abstract extension lemma, which will nearly immediately yield
the model existence theorems. For the proof we adapt the construction of Henkin's completeness
proof from [Hen50].
Theorem 4.24 (Abstract Extension Lemma). Let  be a signature,  

be a compact abstract
consistency class and let H 2  

be a suciently -pure set of -sentences. Then there exists a
-Hintikka set H for  

, such that H  H.
Proof: We construct H by inductively constructing a sequence of sets H
i
such that H
i
2  

.
Then the -Hintikka set is H :=
S
i2IN
H
i
2  

.
Let A
1
;A
2
; : : : be a sequence of all sentences in w
o
(). We dene H
0
:= H and the set H
n+1
according to the table 3. Since the construction is uniform for all kinds of abstract consistency
classes H
n+1
depends on the respective kind of abstract consistency class  

we are interested in
and in the properties of A
n
with respect to this  

.
Next we show by induction, that H
n
2  

for all n 2 IN. The base case holds by construction
(for all kinds of abstract consistency classes). So let H
n
 2  

. We have to show that H
n+1
2  

.
This is trivial in caseH
n
A
n
=2  

(again for all abstract consistency classes). In caseH
n
A
n
2  

we have to consider four sub cases:
1. If A
n
is of form :

B, then we get the conclusion trivially by r
9
(for all cases).
2. If A
n
is of form :(F
:
=
!
G) the conclusion is either trivial (by r
9
in case of an Acc
M
,
Acc
M
b
, Acc
M
f
or Acc
M
fb
) or follows by r
q
.
3. If A
n
is of form :(F =
!
G) the conclusion is either trivial (by r
9
in case of an Acc
M
,
Acc
M
b
, Acc
M
f
, Acc
M
fb
, Acc
M
q
, Acc
M
qb
) or follows by 4.20(5).
4. If A
n
is of any other form, then the conclusion is trivial (for all cases).
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Acc
M
/Acc
M
b
/ Acc
M
q
/Acc
M
qb
/ Acc
M
e
/Acc
M
eb
/
H
n+1
Acc
M
f
/Acc
M
fb
H
n
A
n
=2  

H
n
H
n
H
n
A
n
of form H
n
A
n
 H
n
A
n
 H
n
A
n

:

B :Bw :Bw :Bw
A
n
of form H
n
A
n
H
n
A
n
 H
n
A
n

H
n
A
n
:(F
:
=
!
G) :(Fw
:
=

Gw) :(Fw
:
=

Gw)
2  

and A
n
of form H
n
A
n
H
n
A
n
H
n
A
n

:(F =
!
G) :(Fw =

Gw)
A
n
of other form H
n
A
n
H
n
A
n
H
n
A
n
w 2 

is a constant which is fresh for H
n
Figure 3: Construction of H
n+1
. How to read the table: Assume  

is an an Acc
M
q
and A
n
is of
form :(F
:
=
!
G). The table denes H
n+1
to be H
n
A
n
 :(Fw
:
=

Gw) for a fresh w 2 

in case A
n
2  

and H
n
otherwise.)
Since  

is compact, we also have H 2  

.
Now we know that our inductively dened set H is indeed in  

and that H  H. It only
remains to show that H is maximal in  

. So let A
n
2 w
o
() be the n-th sentence from the above
sequence, such that H A
n
2  

. Since H is closed under subsets we know that H
n
A
n
2  

.
By denition of H
n+1
we conclude that A
n
2 H
n+1
and hence A
n
2 H.
Next we dene two congruence relations which we need in the model existence theorems below
in order to build quotient models.
Denition 4.25. Let  

be an abstract consistency class and H be a Hintikka set for  

. For all
A;B 2 w() we dene:
A

:

H
B

, i A
:
=

B 2 H.
A


H
B

, i
8
<
:
A  B if   
fA;Bg 2 H or fA;Bg \ H  ; if   o
AC 
H
BC for all C 2 w

() if   ! 
Lemma 4.26. Let  

be an abstract consistency class and H be a Hintikka set for  

. Then 
H
is a functional congruence relation, if  

is an Acc
M
and
:

H
is a functional congruence relation,
if  

is an Acc
M
qb
.
Proof:
:

H
is a functional congruence relation by r
:
=
r
, r
:
=
sy
, r
:
=
tr
, r
q
and r
q
0
, which are valid in case
 

is an Acc
M
qb
.
Note that 
H
is a functional congruence by construction.
Remark 4.27. Note that in 3.36 EXT
!
L
does not hold for
:
= and hence
:

H
is not a functional
congruence in case  

is not at least an Acc
M
q
. Hence
:

H
is unsuitable for the model construction
of anM
fb
(orM
b
) from a givenM
f
(orM) as demonstrated below but ts well for the construction
of an M
qb
or M
qb
. Fortunately the relation 
H
is already a functional congruence in case  

is an
Acc
M
f
.
We now use the -Hintikka sets, guaranteed by lemma 4.24, to construct a -valuation for the
-term structure that turns it into the desired model M.
Theorem 4.28 (Model Existence). Let  

be an saturated Acc and H 2  

be a suciently
-pure set of sentences. For all  2 fM;M
f
;M
fb
;M
q
;M
qb
;M
e
;M
eb
g we have: If  

is an Acc

,
then there exists a countable model in * that satises H.
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Proof: Let  

be an abstract consistency class. We can assume without loss of generality
(see lemma 4.12) that  

is compact, so the preconditions of 4.24 are met, and therefore there
exists a -Hintikka set H  w
o
() for  

, such that H  H.
Now, for each dierent kind of abstract consistency class, we will construct a countable model
M
H
of the corresponding type. These model constructions closely reect the relations of the
dierent model types as discussed in section 3 and shown in gures 1 and 2. We start with
the construction of a M and a M
f
based upon the non-functional termstructure TS()

and the
functional TS()

. The remaining model constructions are then based upon these two basic
constructions.
M Let  

be an Acc
M
. Given the -Hintikka set H with H  H from above, we choose
(C) := T, i C 2 H. Note that we have (C) := F, i :C 2 H by r
c
b
. By r

we know
that  is well-dened on cw()
#

and by r
c
b , r
c
c
we have that  is a total function on
D

o
.
Furthermore by r
c
b , r
c
c
, r
_
and r
8
we have that  is a -valuation of the -term
structure TS()

and thus M
H
:= (TS()

; ) is a -model by construction. We have
M
H
j= H , since H  H. Note thatM
H
is indeed countable, since the sets of well-typed
formulae are countable.
M
f
Let  

be an Acc
M
f
and hence also an Acc
M
. Analogous to the previous case we construct
the countable -model M
H
:= (TS()

; ) with M j= H . Note that in this case  is
well-dened on D

T
because of r
f
. By lemma 3.15 we know that M is functional and
hence M is an M
f
.
We proceed with the construction of a M
q
and M
b
based upon the previous construction of a M
and accordingly of aM
q
and aM
fb
based upon aM
f
. Thus we start out with a countable -model
M := (TS()

; ) or M := (TS()

; ) such that M j= H . Property q is easy to verify, as it
follows from the properties discussed in the Hintikka-lemmata 4.14 and 4.16.
M
q
Let  

be an Acc
M
q
. From r
:
=
r
, r
:
=
sy
, r
:
=
tr
, r
q
and r
q
0
we can derive that
:
=

is indeed
the q

required by property q and hence M is a countable M
q
.
To verify property b instead we have to construct a M
0
from M by reducing the set of truth
values to fT; Fg, which can be done with the help of a functional congruence relation.
M
b
,M
fb
Let  

be an Acc
M
q
or Acc
M
fb
. By lemma 4.26, r
b
0
and r
c
c
we can show that the relation

H
dened in 4.25 is a functional -congruence for M and thus, by lemma 3.33, the
quotient structure M=

H
is a functional -model which satises H . From r
c
b , r
c
c
and
the choice of  we conclude that 
H
has exactly two equivalence classes on TS
o
()

.
Thus we have D
o
 fT := [[T
o
]]; F := [[F
o
]]g, if we dene T
o
and F
o
as in lemma 3.25.
Using r
t
and r
c
b we further get that  is the identity relation. Finally note that M=

H
is countable since M is.
We nish the constructions for the cases without a primitive notion of equality with the construc-
tion of a -Henkin model (H =M
qb
) in case we are considering an Acc
M
qb
.
We start with the M
q
M guaranteed by the discussion above. Analogous to the construction
of a M
b
, we make use of a functional congruence relation in order to construct a quotient model
which fullls property b. But instead of the relation 
H
we had to use before, we apply the simpler
relation
:

H
which is a functional congruence relation for M
qb
s.
H =M
qb
By lemma 4.26 and r
b
0
,r
c
c
we know that the relation
:

H
is a functional -congruence
forM, so the quotient structureM=
:

H
is a M
q
with M=
:

H
j= H by lemma 3.33. From
r
c
b , r
c
c
and the choice of , we conclude that 
H
has exactly two equivalence classes
on TS
o
()

. Thus we have D
o
 fT := [[T
o
]]; F := [[F
o
]]g, if we dene T
o
and F
o
as in
lemma 3.25. Using r
t
and r
c
b
we further get that  is the identity relation. Finally note
that M=
:

H
is countable since M is.
It remains to discuss the cases with primitive equality and we start with the M
q
, resp. M
qb
from
above.
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M
e
Let  

be an Acc
M
e
and hence an Acc
M
q
. We construct the countable M
q
M with
M j= H as discussed above. It remains to show that property e is valid for M which
follows from property q by r
=
:
=
and r
=
:
=
0
.
M
eb
This case is analogous: Let  

be an Acc
M
eb
and hence an Acc
M
qb
. We construct a
countable H M := (TS()

; ) with M j= H . It remains to show that property e is
valid for M
H
which follows again from property q by r
=
:
=
and r
=
:
=
0
.
4.5 Order Eects
It is common to stratify higher-order logics with respect to the complexity of symbols and types
allowed to occur in formulae. We will use this stratication for a ner analysis of model existence
for functional -models in this section.
Traditionally, the orders of formulae is dened by the order of the types of symbols occurring in
them: for any k, the formulae of 2k
th
order logic are those in which no variable or parameter of
order greater than k occurs and the formulae of 2k 1
th
order logic are those in which no variable
of order greater than k is quantied over. Here, the order ord
n
() of a type  2 T is dened
inductively as ord
n
() = 0 and ord
n
(o) = 1, and ord
n
(
n
! ) = max
in
ord(
i
) + 1, where
 2 BT . With this convention, rst-order logic is the classical notion, only individual variables
can be quantied over.
In this paper, we will adopt a slightly dierent denition of order that does not distinguish
between quantied variables or constants as a ner distinction does not seem to yield suitable
restrictions for our model existence theorems. Moreover, we do not commit to a particular order,
since can identify sucient conditions a general order function .
Denition 4.29 (Type Ordering). We call a function : T  ! IN a type ordering, if
(); ()  ( ! ). We say that  is of order k 2 IN, i ()  k. We will say that
a formula is of order k, i the types of all of its its subterms are. Similarly, for a signature  or a
substitution , where we require all constants (all (X), where (X) 6= X) to be of order k.
We will denote the sets of (closed) well-formed formulae of order k with w
k
() (cw
k
()).
Note that the sets w
k

(), cw
k

() are empty if k  (), and that w
k
(), cw
k
() are closed
under substitutions of order k and is therefore also closed under -reduction.
We will call a type ordering  nite, i for any given k 2 IN, the set T
k

:= f


()  k; k 2
INg is nite.
Example 4.30 (Type Ordering). We have already mentioned the classical ordering scheme for
higher-order types above. Note that ord
n
is a type ordering and if we dene ord( ! ) =
max(; ) + 1, then ord
n
is a nite type ordering.
The function : T  ! f0g that gives all types the order zero is trivially a type orderin, albeit
a very uninteresting one, since with this ordering, all results of this section are subsumed by the
results above.
With the notion of type ordering, we can make a ner distinction between Henkin and Standard
model.
Denition 4.31 (k-Standard Models). Let  be a type ordering, then we call a -structure or
-model k-standard wrt. , i D
!
is full (i.e. if D
!
= F(D

;D

)) for all types !  of
order  k. With this denition a standard model is a 0-standard one, since the order of functional
type is positive. Clearly, we can construct from any -structure or -model M a k-standard one
(which we will denote with M
k
), by replacing the function universes related to a type of order
 k appropriate full sets of functions and adjusting the application operator accordingly.
Denition 4.32 (k  -Structure, k  -Model). We call a pre--structure a k -structure,
i E
'
meets the conditions in 3.10 for all A 2 w
k
(), and we call a k -structure a k -model,
i it has a valuation.
4.5 Order Eects 29
Theorem 4.33 (Term Structure of order k).
Let TS()
;k
:= (D
k
;@
k
; I
k
) be the k-standard -structure induced by TS()

, then TS()
;k
is a functional -structure, and furthermore for all A 2 w

() that I
k
'
(A) = (A)
#

if
ord(A)  k and  = '


Free(A)
.
Proof: We prove that I
k
'
is a total function and that I
k
'
(A) = (A)
#

if ord(A)  k and
 = '


Free(A)
by an induction on the structure of A 2 w

(). Note that totality of I
k
'
ensures
that TS()
;k
is a functional -structure.
The case when A = c 2  is trivial, since totality of I
k
'
is guaranteed by the totality of I and
if ord(A)  k we have I
k
'
(A) = I(A) = A = (A)
#

.
If A = X 2 V , totality of I
k
'
follows from totality of  and furthermore in case ord(A)  k
we get since X 2 Dom() that (X)
#

= '(X) = I
k
'
(X).
Next we consider the case when A

is of form B
!
C

. If ord(A)  k the assertions
immediately follow from 3.15, since up to order k the construction of TS()
;k
is identical with
TS()

. In case ord(A) > k note that D

is full and hence I
k
'
(A) 2 D

, which is all we have to
show.
In the last case A

is of form X

B

. If ord(A) > k we only have to show that
I
k
'
(A) 2 D

which holds since D

is full. If ord(A)  k we have I
k
'
(A)@
k
c = I
k
';[c=X]
(B)
forall c 2 D

and by induction hypothesis that I
k
';[c=X]
(B) = (; [c=X ](B))
#

. Furthermore
we have (; [c=X ](B))
#

= (([c=X ]B))
#

= ((Ac))
#

= ((A)c)
#

= ((A))
#

@
k
c. Thus
I
k
'
(A) = (A)
#

.
Now, we are in the position to prove a ner-grained model-existence theorem. For this we
will rst weaken the denition of an abstract consistency class by weakening the conditions for
universal quantication in Denition 4.4 by restricting the sets possible instantiations.
Denition 4.34 (Abstract Consistency Class with Order). Let  
k

be an Acc

, where  2
fM;M
b
;M
f
;M
fb
;M
q
;M
qb
;M
e
;M
eb
g and the condition r
8
is replaced by the following one
r
k
8
If 

F 2  and ord() = k, then  FG 2  

for each G 2 w
k

().
then we call  
k

an Acc

with order k and write Acc
k

.
Lemma 4.35 (k-Hintikka lemmata). Clearly, we can prove analoga to all Hintikka theorems
in section 4.2. The only dierence lies in the r
8
and r
9
cases of Theorem 4.14 where we have
r
8


F 2 H, i for each D 2 cw
k

() we have FD 2 H.
r
9
:

F 2 H, i there is a D 2 cw
k

() such that :FD 2 H.
Proof: We get the rst assertion directly by r
k
8
and the second by r
9
observing that the
witness constant is of type  and therefore (D) = ()  ( ! o) = ord(

)  (:

F) 
(). We have analogous assertions and argumentations for r
k
q
and r
k
q
0
in Theorem 4.16 and for
r
=
q
and r
=
q
0
in Theorem 4.22.
This gives us the following model existence theorem:
Theorem 4.36 (Model Existence). Let  

be a saturated Acc
k
and H 2  

be a suciently
-pure set of sentences. For all  2 fM
f
;M
fb
;M
qb
;M
e
;M
eb
g we have: If  

is an Acc
k

, then there
exists a model in * that satises H.
Proof: In the extension Lemma 4.24 we can guarantee a  

-Hintikka set H with ord(H) =
ord(H) for any set H 2  

: If we take the sequence A
1
;A
2
; : : : to be an enumeration of w()
k
,
where k = (H) and consider the construction of H
n+1
in table 3, then we see that (H
n+1
) =
(H
n
), since the formulae added to H
n
are either witness constants of type  or subformulae of
A
n
. In both cases the order cannot be greater than k.
The constructions of the -models are analogous to the respective constructions in Theo-
rem 4.28. The only dierence is that we will use TS()
;k
instead of TS()

as a starting
30 REFERENCES
point. Since the Hintikka set H guaranteed by the extended extension Lemma has order k, and
TS()
;k
is a k--algebra by 4.33, the constructions from Theorem 4.28 go through directly.
Remark 4.37. An application of this theorem is that we can use this strengthened theorem to
prove the long-standing conjecture that that in machine-oriented calculi it is sucient to restrict
primitive substitutions [And89] to the order of the input formulae. This is important for the
implementation of fair strategies in automated deduction systems, since the primitive substitution
rule without this observation is innitely branching (there are innitely many quantiers 

, since
T is innite). If we employ a nite type ordering , then we only have to consider the nite set
of quantiers 

, where  2 T
k

. For practical implementations it remains to construct type
orderings that make T
k

as small as possible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given an overview over the landscape of semantics for classical higher-order
logics. We have dierentiated ten dierent possible notions and have tied the discerning properties
to conditions of the abstract consistency classes. The model existence theorems presented in this
paper can serve as an instrument for the design of higher-order calculi.
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6 Index
-Henkin model, 13
-Hintikka set, 20
-algebra, 11
-congruence, 8
-homomorphism, 8
-model, 5, 12, 13
-model with full equality, 16
-standard model, 13
-structure, 9, 28
-valuation, 12
-valuation with equality, 16
 

-extension, 20
-term structure for , 9
-term structure for , 9
k--structure, 28
k-Hintikka lemmata, 29
k-standard model, 28
abstract consistency class, 18, 28
abstract consistency class with order k, 28
abstract consistency class with primitive equality, 23
application operator, 7
assignment, 9
atomically saturated, 19
bound variables, 2
canonical projection, 8
carrier set, 7
closed formulae, 2
closed under subsets, 18
compact, 18
compact abstract consistency classes, 20
compactness, 18
congruence for -models, 13
denotation, 9, 10
domain, 7
equality relation, 3
evaluation function, 9
extension lemma, 25
extensionality, 3
extensionality for truth values, 16
extensionality in -models, 14
extensionality in -models with full equality, 16
extensionality of Leibniz equality, 13, 16
extensionality principle on truth values, 5, 13
falsity, 12
free variables, 2
full, 11
full equality, 16
full pre--algebra, 11
functional extensionality, 16
functional -congruence, 8
functional -model, 5, 13
functional extensionality principle, 5, 13
functional pre--structure, 7
Henkin model, 3, 13
Henkin-model with full equality, 16
Higher-Order Logic, 2
Hintikka lemma, 21, 22, 24, 29
Hintikka set, 20
homomorphic extension, 10
interpretation of constants, 7
Leibniz equality, 3, 13, 15
Leibniz equality in -models, 13
Leibniz' formulation of equality, 2
logical constants, 2
maximal  

-extension, 20
Meta-equality, 3
model existence theorem, 6, 29
model existence theorem with order k, 29
model existence theorems, 17, 26
non-atomic consistency, 19
order eects, 27
pre--algebra, 11
pre--structure, 7
primitive equality, 16, 23
properties for abstract consistency classes, 18
properties of Leibniz equality, 15
property b, 5, 6, 13
property e, 16
property f, 13
property q, 5, 13
proposition, 2
quotient -model, 13
quotient -Structure, 9
saturated, 19
sentence, 2
signature , 2
specialized -model classes, 13
standard model, 3, 13, 28
suciently pure, 18
term structure for , 9
term structure of order k, 28
total pre--structure, 7
truth, 12
type ordering, 27
typed collection of sets, 7
typed mapping, 7
universe of type , 7
value, 10
well-formed formulae, 2
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